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Decolonizing Human Trafficking in Cambodia
by Corrin Chow

INTRODUCTION

victim is inherently innocence, helpless, and powerless
in the face of the primitive savage. The savior acts as a
shield against the savage’s tyranny and “protects, vindicates, civilizes restrains, and safeguards.”[8]

The 2000 U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (“Trafficking Protocol”) is a prosecution-driven solution to human trafficking.[1] However,
under a decolonized analysis, the Protocol ignores
victims’ and survivors’ agency, thus perpetuating
ill-fitted solutions. This case study is about Cambodia.
In 2008, Cambodia passed national counter-trafficking
legislation entitled the Law of Suppression of Human
Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation (LHTSE).[2] Although these were celebratory moments, statistics on
prosecuted cases and convictions are lacking. The U.S.
Department of State, which monitors the Cambodian
government’s remedial measures, ranked Cambodia’s
weak efforts in the annual U.S. Trafficking in Persons
Report (TIP Report).[3] The Cambodian Phnom Penh
Post, an English-newspaper established since 1992,
reported government spokesman Phay Siphan speaking against Cambodia’s 2019 Tier 2 Watchlist status.[4]
He said, “[w]e have failed to satisfy the U.S. but, in line
with the code of ethics and culture of Cambodia, we
are committed to combatting trafficking.”[5] There is
a pertinent human trafficking crisis in Cambodia, but
implementation is an issue. Since the current criminal
justice approach is not procuring favorable results,
scrutinizing the current model through a decolonized
lens might suggest a more pertinent approach.

Embodied in the SVS critique is an understanding that
cultural differences and race relations influence and
construe who is the savage, victim, or savior. As we assess Cambodia’s counter-trafficking efforts, SVS highlights two flaws in Cambodia’s LHTSE and enforcement mechanisms. Firstly, Cambodia’s internalization
of the U.N. Protocol ignored the victim-stakeholder’s
priorities, and, consequently, Cambodia’s relationship
with Western influences color the problematic realities
of implementing LHTSE.
The influence of SVS on Cambodia’s counter-human
trafficking measures taken during Cambodia’s late
20th-century sociopolitical history. Under the Marxist Khmer Rouge leadership, Cambodia experienced
gruesome civil war and the genocide of Cambodia’s
intellectual class and political dissidents.[9] The United Nations sent the U.N. Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) to help re-establish Cambodia
in 1992. UNTAC’s arrival coincided with an increase
in local sex work and the explosion of mostly Western NGOs.[10] Reportedly, when Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen was asked what the UNTAC’s legacy
would be, he replied, “AIDS.”[11] The human rights
savior created the savagery of sex trafficking within
Cambodia that perpetuated Cambodia’s victimhood.
Certain international NGOs framed the trafficking
issue to significant donors by claiming the newly
developing Cambodian government was too weak to
address the problem.

A decolonized perspective critiques the Eurocentric
and Western bias in international human rights norms
and regimes. Makua Mutua best explains this perspective using the savage-victim-savior (SVS) imagery.[6]
The savage represents the State or cultural foundations
that “choke or oust civil society” or cause the culture
to deviate from human rights.[7] Individuals whose
dignity and human rights are violated by savage state
practices and cultures are perceived as victims. The

This western influence and demand on Cambodia
continue with the TIP Report. Countries on the Tier
2 Watchlist have not complied with the minimum
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standards listed in the U.S. Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protections Act of 2000 and have not
demonstrated significant progress.[12] The TIP Report
incentivizes the re-structuring of human rights violating states by threatening economic sanctions on totally
non-compliant countries.[13]

were looking for significant donor funding, Cambodia
“hastily enacted” its 1996 statute without much understanding of trafficking; for instance, the undefined
“accomplice” could criminalize law enforcement, protecting the brothels.[19] The statute also criminalized
commercial sex work only (disregarding forced labor)
and indiscriminately labeled the “victim” as a person
who voluntarily consented to engage in commercial
sex work.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
The U.N. Protocol’s definition of “trafficking in persons” includes many crucial, but non-legal, terms,
like: “exploitation” and “abuse of power” that have
muddied an otherwise operational definition to detect
victims and perpetrators. Cambodia, like many other
countries, has adopted the Protocol’s definition word
for word. In adopting and modeling LHTSE after the
Protocol’s definitions and priorities, Cambodia misses
the opportunity to prioritize the trafficking victim/
survivor’s priorities. LHTSE features only four articles concerning the victim’s welfare: right of nullified
and voided exploitative contracts (Article 45), right
to damages and restitution (Articles 46-7), right to
concealed identity from being published or broadcasted (Article 49). In Cambodia’s 2010 Criminal Code to
LHTSE, Article 287 criminalizes any prevention of a
public agency or “competent private organization” that
assists victims or at-risk persons.[14]

In the early 2000s, the Bush Administration—who
considered all sex work as forced and exploitative—
supported Cambodia and other countries with $50
million to pass new anti-trafficking bills.[20] Cambodia, with the consultation of an international group,
passed the 2008 LHTSE. However, the 2008 LHTSE
did not address the 1996 LHTSE’s inconsistencies or
leave the emphasis on sex trafficking; neither did it
interpret what “exploitation” meant (Keo 2014).[21]
According to the Cambodia Center for Human Rights
(CCHR) 2010 report, the application of LHTSE has
been “inconsistent at best and incorrect at worst.”[22]
One of CCHR’s recommendations regarding victim
protection was that the Cambodian government
should ensure Cambodia’s judiciary recognizes that
victim protection is crucial to prosecution, and should
implement and adhere to a common minimum standard of care for victims of human trafficking.

Cambodia does have a minimum standards of protection policy, which presents itself as victims-first
legislation.[15] The 2009 policy strives to fill in a human rights gap but within a prosecution framework. It
includes progressive measures, such as Article 6(10), a
victim’s right to a reasonable reflection period before
making a decision.[16] This recovery time allows a
victim to access services and begin recovery without
undue pressure to cooperate with law enforcement or
make an immediate decision.[17] Unfortunately, these
minimum standards fall short of full judicial adherence and implementation.[18]

B. Benefits of a Decolonized Approach
Cambodia’s economic and governance dependency
makes it suspectable to the good intentions of foreign
organizations and stakeholders.[23] Human trafficking
is a horrific violation that should be eradicated. However, the SVS critique prompts an awareness that not
all good intentions thoughtfully produce objectives or
laws sensitive to power imbalances, colonial influences, and the complexities of contributory factors to human trafficking within the context of the individual’s
daily world. Legal practitioners, advocates, and policymakers must be aware that the various stakeholders
in the counter-trafficking sector may have conflicting
interests and/or different priorities (Gallagher and
Surtees 2011).[24] Cambodia’s anti-trafficking framework cannot be separated from its history of the West’s
influence. The international community’s desire to
rescue and redeem Cambodia from its horrific Khmer
Rouge is dangerously paternalistic. This paternalism
overshadows the deeply imbedded ethnic stereotypes,

ANALYSIS
A. Critiquing the Development and Application of
Counter-Trafficking Law
Cambodia’s 2008 LHTSE amended the 1996 Law
on Suppression of the Kidnapping, Trafficking, and
Exploitation of Human Beings. Under pressure from
multiple anti-trafficking NGOs and programs that
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ethnic preferences, migrant workers, and misogyny of
victimhood.[25] These biases may determine which
victims get rescued by law enforcement and their cases
prosecuted. Clear demarcations between who is/is not
a victim do not provide justice for the diverse perspectives and experiences of Southeast Asian sex workers.
Justice calls for making the worker’s voice the dominant and influential narrative.

1 G.A. Res. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, (Nov. 15, 2000).
2 National Assembly of Cambodia, Law on Suppression
of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation 2008, NS/
RKM/0208/005 (Dec. 20, 2007).
3 U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, (June 2019).
4 Id.
5 Long Kimmarita, US human trafficking report ‘biased’,
THE PHNOM PENH POST (June 24, 2019) https://www.
phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/us-human-trafficking-report-%E2%80%98biased%E2%80%99.
6 Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of
Human Rights, 42 Harv. L.J. 204, 204-209 (2001)
7 Id. at 202.
8 Id. at 204.
9 Editors, Khmer Rouge, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.
history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge.
10 Chenda Keo, Thierry Bouhours, Roderic Broadhurst, & Brigitte Bouhours, Human Trafficking and Moral Panic in Cambodia, 653 American Academy of Political and Social Science
202-224 (2014).
11 Susan Rosas, Sex Trafficking in Cambodia as a Complex
Humanitarian Emergency, University of Chicago (2011), https://
www.ssa.uchicago.edu/sex-trafficking-cambodia-complex-humanitarian-emergency.
12 U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 3; 28 U.S.C. § 7106 (2020).
13 U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 3.
14 Cambodia Criminal Law, Book 1, tit. 1.
15 Government of Cambodia, Policy on the Protection of the
Rights of Victims of Human Trafficking, (Aug. 31, 2009).
16 Id.
17 Virtual Knowledge Centre to End Violence against Women
and Girls, Reflection Period, UN WOMEN (Jan. 25, 2011), http://
www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/563-reflection-period.html.
18 Cambodian Center for Human Rights, Human Trafficking
Trials in Cambodia, THE ASIA FOUNDATION (July 2010).
19 Keo, supra note 10, at 206.
20 Human Trafficking – A New Form of Slavery, The White
House, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/
traffic/
21 Keo, supra note 10, at 207.
22 Cambodian Center for Human Rights, supra note 18, at 40.
23 Selim Jahan et. al, Human Development Indices and Indicators, U.N.D.P (2018).
24 Anne Gallagher and Rebecca Surtees, Assessing the Impact
and Effectiveness of Anti-Trafficking Interventions in the Criminal Justice Sector: A Discussion Paper on Issues, Obstacles and
Opportunities, http://un-act.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/
assessing-impact-and-effectiveness-of-at-interventions-in-cj-sector-gallagher-surtees-2011.pdf
25 https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wr0mn.8
26 Ian Urbina, ‘Sea Slaves’: The Human Misery that Feeds Pets
and Livestock, N.Y. TIMES ( July 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-ocean-thailand-fishing-seaslaves-pets.html.

A decolonized approach also recognizes the SVS critique in Cambodia’s legislation. Cambodia’s legislation
was passed with the substantial help and influence of
international voices. Cambodia inherited the ideals
of the savior without coming into its own voice. The
Western condemned Cambodia’s governance ideals
as savage while simultaneously recasting Cambodia’s
new democracy as an unblemished project, free and
separated from the legacies of its colonial past. As a
result, Cambodia’s legislative focus on sex trafficking
perpetuates a feminization of victimhood, excluding
the thousands of trafficked Cambodian men working
in Thai fishing vessels.[26] A decolonized perspective
encourages identifying which actors and systems support trafficking schemes. Let the survivors and advocates lead the data collection by setting metrics based
on their insight into the industry. Cambodia, not a
Eurocentric entity, should identify which stakeholders’
voices could best navigate through and whose priorities best address anti-trafficking.
CONCLUSION
Some may argue that a victim-centered approach is
only as good as the enforcement. They may propose
that, since corruption has made cooperation between
the Cambodian police and judicial systems weak,
perhaps Western intervention would be more helpful
than leaving Cambodia’s government alone. A Western powers-backed prosecutorial crackdown of senior
Cambodian government officials may be best practice
to change the culture of corruption from top-down.
It may show that counter-trafficking efforts must be
taken seriously. Nevertheless, prosecution should not
be the only approach. Corruption is a symptom of
a cultural norm. In order to tackle a pervasive practice, SVS critique forces human rights practitioners
to consider the victims/survivors themselves. Relying
on the survivors and advocates and listening to their
priorities is how well-meaning interventions can avoid
harmful implications.
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Punished for Being Abused: The Unfair
Prosecution of Children Affiliated with ISIS
by Mary Kate O’Connell

Since regaining control of their state from ISIS in 2017,
Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government Authorities
(KRG) have arrested and detained approximately 1,500
children for alleged ISIS affiliation.[1] Of the children
detained, an estimated 185 have been convicted for
terrorism and sentenced to prison in Iraq.[2]
Many of these children were not voluntary affiliates
of ISIS and should not be imprisoned for serving as
child soldiers. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on
Children Associated with Armed Forces of Armed
Groups (“Paris Principles”) defines a child soldier as a
person under 18 who has been recruited or used by an
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to, children used as fighters, cooks,
porters, spies or for sexual purposes.[3] Since 2014,
ISIS has kidnapped, bought, and enslaved children to
assist with terrorist operations.[4] ISIS has recruited
the children using aggressive propaganda that persuades parents that giving their children to ISIS leads
to wealth, honor, and prosperity for the family.[5] In
some ISIS controlled areas of Syria, high school and
university students were required to pledge allegiance
to ISIS to graduate.[6] Once successfully recruited by
ISIS, many of these children are placed into religious
camps where they are indoctrinated with ISIS’ beliefs
and missions.[7] Recruited children over the age of
ten are then placed into military training.[8] If any
child tries to escape or dissent, they are often beaten
or killed.[9] ISIS has the most widespread use of child
soldiers in modern history and continues to use child
soldiers to this day.[10]

retain their human rights as children and international
law must be applied to any proceedings involving the
children.[12] More specifically, under international
law, the children may not be subjected to torture or
cruel punishment, may not be sentenced to death nor
life imprisonment without possibility of release, and
may not be deprived of their liberty.[13] The Paris
Principles also require that all appropriate action is
taken to ensure family re-unification and the re-integration of the child into society.[14] The release
process of a child from an armed group is crucial to
the child’s re-integration, and the child should not be
detained or prohibited from receiving rehabilitative
services.[15] The KRG is violating the Paris Principles
by immediately detaining children released from ISIS
control and using torture methods to elicit confessions
of ISIS affiliations from children. The KRG has also
not taken any necessary steps to assist in the rehabilitation or re-integration of child soldiers released from
ISIS.[16]
Punishing child soldiers also violates the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict.[17] While the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child outlines each child’s juvenile justice rights,
the 2000 Optional Protocol specifically addresses the
issue of children involved in armed conflict.[18] Reaffirming the importance of protecting children’s rights,
the Protocol describes the harmful impact of armed
conflict on children and prohibits the recruitment
or participation of any person under the age of 18 in
armed conflict.[19] Article 7 of the Optional Protocol
specifically requires member states to assist in the rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons under
18 who were recruited and involved in armed conflict.
[20] Iraq ratified the Optional Protocol in 2008 which
means that the KRG’s current detention and sentencing of ISIS child soldiers is in violation of international

KRG’s criminalization of children for their involuntary
service to ISIS as child soldiers violates international
law.[11] Under the Paris Principles and Guidelines on
Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed
Groups (“Paris Principles”), children who escape or
are released from involvement with armed forces
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law.[21]

form/isis-child-soldiers-yezidi/.
8 Id.
9 Erin McLaughlin, How ISIS recruits children, then kills them,
CNN (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/19/middleeast/isis-child-soldiers/index.html.
10 Dozier, supra note 7.
11 UN Children and Armed Conflict, Ending the Use of Child
Soldiers, (Feb 12 2017), https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2017/02/ending-the-use-of-child-soldiers/.
12 UNICEF, Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated
with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Feb. 2007).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Becker, supra note 1
17 UN Commission on Human Rights, 2000 Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res 54/263 (May 25, 2000).
18 UN Commission on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights
of the Child, G.A. Res 74 (Mar. 7, 1990).
19 UN Commission on Human Rights, supra note 17.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Iraq.
23 UN Commission on Human Rights, supra note 17.
24 UN Commission on Human Rights, supra note 18.

As a signer of the Optional Protocol, Iraq should be
held accountable for violating Article 7. While the
KRG is a semi-autonomous region of Iraq, it is considered part of Iraq by the United Nations. Therefore,
since the KRG has violated the 2000 Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Iraq
is a signing member of this treatise, the UN Security
Council should make efforts to intervene in the KRG’s
punishment and detainment of child soldiers of ISIS.
Such efforts should include requiring the KRG to release child soldiers after questioning and to implement
reunification plans between child soldiers and family
members. Unfortunately, Iraq is not a state member of
the International Criminal Court, which means that
the ICC’s ability to intervene in the KRG’s punishment
of child soldiers is limited.[22]
Given the recent actions of KRG towards child soldiers
released from ISIS control, the international community can and should intervene under the 2000 Optional Protocol to prevent further punishment of child
soldiers.[23] The UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child requires member states to take corrective action
to protect the best interests of children and to allow all
children to enjoy basic human rights.[24] KRG is violating the basic human rights of ISIS child soldiers by
preventing them from family reunification and using
torture methods to elicit confessions. International law
requires the reintegration and rehabilitation of child
soldiers, and KRG is violating international law by
instead detaining, convicting, and imprisoning child
soldiers for their involuntary affiliation with ISIS.
1 Jo Becker, “Everyone Must Confess” Abuses against Children Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in Iraq, Human RightsWatch
(Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/06/everyone-must-confess/abuses-against-children-suspected-isis-affiliation-iraq#page.
2 Id.
3 UNICEF, Child recruitment by armed forces or armed groups,
(Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.unicef.org/protection/57929_58007.
html.
4 Agnes Collet, ISIS and child soldiers: what future for the Islamic
State?, HUMANIUM (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.humanium.
org/en/isis-child-soldiers/.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Kimberly Dozier, They Were Children When They Were Kidnapped By ISIS and Forced to Fight. What Happens Now That
They’re Home?, TIME (May 23, 2019) https://time.com/long63
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Court of Justice of the European Union Rules
Against Polish Law on the Supreme Court
by Ben Phillips

The Europe Union (EU) is embroiled in an internal
struggle over the rule of law and preserving its democratic rights and values against creeping authoritarianism. The Polish legislature passed a law that lowered
the retirement age of Supreme Court judges to remove
current judges and pack the courts with judges that are
loyal to the Law and Justice Party. In Commission v.
Poland, case C619/18 (6/24/19), Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) ruled that the Polish Law on
the Supreme Court (“Law on the Supreme Court”) was
contrary to EU law.[1] The CJEU addressed Poland’s
practice of packing courts with loyal political appointees and demonstrated how this subverts judiciary
independence.[2] This decision is a major development in combating the trend of authoritarian regimes
using legal methods to undermine democratic checks
and balances.

Minister Victor Orban’s Fidesz Party in Hungary.
These two authoritarian regimes denounce the European judiciary for undue interference with national
politics and espouse a form of unchecked nationalism.
[7] This CJEU case on Poland’s attempted court packing is part of a larger narrative stemming from the
“rule of law crisis” and challenges to the principles of
democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights
law enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union and in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.[8]
At first glance, the issue of court packing may not
stand out as a democratic or human rights issue.
Many countries have packed courts without human
rights implications. However, Hungary and Poland are
packing their courts to undermine accountability and
judicial independence.[9] The right to effective remedy
and the right to a fair trial before independent national
judiciaries are specifically protected by Articles eight
and ten of the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights.[10] The right to effective remedy and fair trial
are also protected under Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.[11] The
right to a fair trial and judicial independence are critical to protecting individual rights, and these rights are
also imperative for enforcing checks on other human
rights abuses as well.

The Law on the Supreme Court, passed on April 3,
2018, forced Supreme Court judges to retire at the age
of sixty-five, unless they are granted an extension by
the President. The CJEU struck down this law on June
24, 2019 for violating EU law on rule of law and independent judiciaries.[3] The CJEU is the constitutional
supranational court of the EU, and they are often
trying to balance protecting the uniformity of EU law
and respecting the autonomy of the European member
states. Here, the Court held that the Polish law had no
legitimate government interest and violated the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).[4] The
CJEU specifically pointed to the principles of independent judiciaries and the irremovability of judges. The
EU is currently embroiled in what has been called the
“rule of law crisis.”[5] Prior to this case being decided
by the CJEU, the European Commission referred the
matter of the breakdown in the rule of law in Hungary,
Poland, and Romania to the Council of Europe.[6] The
two major regimes that have brought about this crisis
are the Law and Justice Party in Poland and Prime

These authoritarian regimes use legal methods to
undermine their own institutions and advance their
illiberal law and policies. There are concerted efforts
in both Hungary and Poland to dismantle democratic
protections.[12] These regimes did not gain power
all at once. Instead, their leaders and political groups
have slowly and strategically subverted their country’s democratic institutions and processes in order to
entrench themselves in power and destroy the checks
and balances within their systems.[13] These regimes
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focused on compromising the impartiality of the
judiciary, replacing judges and packing courts, and
increasing political appointments of loyal judges.[14]
The compromised impartiality of the Polish and Hungarian judiciaries have paved the way for attacks on
reporters, detaining asylum seekers and immigrants in
Hungary, and restricting the rights of Civil Society Organizations and Human Rights organizations to gather
freely in Poland.[15] These largely unchecked actions
are possible, in part, thanks to the Polish and Hungarian regimes sabotage of their democratic institutions.
These actions are the backdrop for the CJEU decision
in Commission v. Poland.

that these countries are still able to be held accountable and cannot completely evade enforcement. Outside of actual changes caused by the CJEU decision, it
also represents an ideological demonstration that the
EU will take active measures to stand against policies
and laws meant to undermine judicial independence
and other democratic values. The intervention of the
EU and the CJEU is a concrete step toward combatting
undemocratic policies and laws that limit access to an
independent judiciary and a fair trial.
The CJEU decision on Poland’s Law on the Supreme
Court is an important moment in addressing the rule
of law crisis in Europe. The EU must apply and replicate these processes in the other member states in the
EU that are employing similar practices to threaten the
independence of their judiciaries. This is imperative
to combat the erosion of judicial independence and
maintain checks on authoritarian executive and legislative powers. The right to a fair trial and independent
judiciary are vital human rights because they protect
the rule of law and ensure that other obligations are
being enforced.

The CJEU struck down the Law on the Supreme Court
because it violated EU Law. Specifically, the CJEU
cited to Article 19(1) of the TEU, “Member States shall
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal
protection” of EU law and Article 47 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the
right to effective remedy and a fair trial.[16] The Court
argued that Poland’s compulsory retirement of judges
on the Supreme Court undermined the independence
and effectiveness of the judiciary, in violation of the
fact that domestic courts are also EU courts and must
monitor the effective implementation of EU law.[17]
The Court further argued that the law compromised
the judges’ impartiality because the President had
complete discretion to extend (or not extend) judicial
terms past the retirement age.[18] The Court ruled
that court packing and eroding judicial independence
violated the principle of rule of law espoused in Article
2 of the TEU, which lays out the fundamental principles of the EU and its member states.[19] This ruling
shows that the CJEU and laws of the EU can still be
relied on to deal with the rule of law crisis in Europe.

1 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No.
81/19: Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (June 24, 2019).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id; Daniel Hegedüs, No End in Sight for the EU’s Democracy
and Rule of Law Crisis, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF
THE UNITED STATES (March 11, 2019), http://www.gmfus.org/
blog/2019/03/11/no-end-sight-eus-democracy-and-rule-law-crisis.
6 European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission
acts to defend judicial independence in Poland, https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367.
7 Phillippe Dam, EU foot-dragging puts rule of law at risk in
Hungary, Poland, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/10/eu-foot-dragging-putsrule-law-risk-hungary-poland#.
8 Christian Davies, The battle for the rule of law in Poland will
have consequences across Europe, Prospect Mag. (June 27, 2019),
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/the-battle-for-therule-of-law-in-poland-will-have-consequences-across-europe;
Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, O.J. (C 326); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 A (Dec. 10, 1948).
9 Dam, supra note 7.
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8.
11 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art. 47, Dec. 14, 2007, O.J.
(C 303).
12 Krisztina Than, Hungary plans new administrative court,
rejects rule of law concerns, REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-courts-minister/hungary-

Since the CJEU’s judgement, the judges removed by
the Law on the Supreme Court have been reinstated.
[20] If the CJEU can have such effect in Poland, it can
also monitor other laws and policies that undermine
judicial independence in Romania and other European countries edging towards illiberal policies and
authoritarianism.[21] These governments intentionally
compromise their own judiciaries to silence political
opposition and circumvent the enforcement of other
human rights obligations. However, the effective use
of the CJEU and other EU institutions is an important
strategy to curb the spread and empowerment of authoritarian regimes. Most importantly, it demonstrates
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plans-new-administrative-courts-rejects-rule-of-law-concernsidUSKCN1M0178; Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party is doing
lasting damage, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.
economist.com/europe/2018/04/21/polands-ruling-law-and-justice-party-is-doing-lasting-damage
13 Dam, supra note 7; Leonid Bershidsky, The EU is Winning
Its Rule-of-Law Challenges, BLOOMBERG OPINION (June 5,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-05/
eu-successfully-stands-up-for-courts-in-hungary-poland-romania
14 Bershidsky, supra note 13.
15 Roy Greenslade, Three journalists beaten and detained by
Hungarian border police, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/sep/17/
three-journalists-beaten-and-detained-by-hungarian-border-police; Global Detention Project, Hungary Immigration Detention, https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/
hungary; Civic Solidarity, Polish authorities reduce the space
for the activities of NGOs including human rights organizations
in the country, https://www.civicsolidarity.org/article/1545/
polish-authorities-reduce-space-activities-ngos-including-human-rights-organizations.
16 Treaty on European Union, supra note 8 art. 19; EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, supra note 11.
17 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, C-64/16 (Supreme Administrative Court, Portugal, 2018).
18 Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 1.
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A New Approach: Gang-based Asylum in
the Age of “Zero Tolerance”
by Caylee Watson

A record number of migrants are fleeing the Northern
Triangle. In recent years, about 265,000 migrants have
left annually. This number is on track to more than
double in 2019.[1] Gang violence, corruption, and a
lack of economic opportunity and security challenge
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.[2] Homicide
rates in the Northern Triangle have been among the
world’s highest for decades.[3] It is no secret that the
U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s through the 1990s
laid the foundation for much of the instability in the
region. Over the past twenty years, the U.S. has attempted, with limited effect, to remedy the situation
by aiding programs that try to combat the underlying
issues causing some of the instability.

the number of migrants and have led to overcrowded
detention centers and a massive backlog in U.S. immigration courts.
One aspect of immigration policy that the Administration cannot override through proclamation or
executive order is asylum law. Under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol, the U.S. cannot deny entry
to asylum seekers.[10] Domestically, an asylum applicant meets the definition of a refugee under INA
§ 101(a)(42) if the person seeking asylum is “unable
or unwilling to return to . . . [his or her] country [of
origin] because of persecution or a well- founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”[11]

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald
Trump promised to reduce “illegal immigration.”[4]
When he became president, in addition to developing
a scheme to build a wall on the Mexican northern-U.S.
southern border, President Trump enacted “zero-tolerance” policies that led to family separation.[5] Since
Trump took office three years ago, not only has the
United States seen an influx in irregular entries at the
southern border, but the zero-tolerance policies may
even violate domestic and international law.[6]

However, in the past year, alongside the above-mentioned executive orders, the Attorney General (“AG”)
has decided a number of cases that impede traditional Asylum law.[12] In Matter of A-B- and Matter of
L-E-A-, the AG attempted to limit the scope of the
frequently utilized protected ground, “particular social
group,” by asylum applicants fleeing gang violence in
the Northern Triangle.[13] Prior to Matter of L-E-Aand Matter of A-B-, an applicant could demonstrate
that they were persecuted as a member of a particular
social group if they could show that they were persecuted because of gender-based domestic violence or
because of their familiar ties. Now, in circuit courts
that lack overriding precedent, both Attorney General
Sessions’ and Barr’s interpretations present problems
for applicants. This article suggests a supplementary
approach—(imputed) political opinion—for attorneys
representing asylum applicants fleeing gang-based
persecution.

For example, in the spring of 2018, the Trump Administration (“Administration”) implemented a zero-tolerance policy which sought to criminally prosecute all
adults entering the United States irregularly, including
asylum seekers, and those traveling with children.
[7] Simultaneously, the Administration cut hundreds
of millions of dollars in aid to the Northern Triangle
because the countries “failed to slow migration flows
to the United States.”[8] These policies contradict each
other — experts agree that cutting off assistance aimed
to help programs improve safety and economic security in the region was only going to cause migration
to increase.[9] In fact, the policies have failed to slow

For an applicant to establish their eligibility for asylum
on account of political opinion, the applicant must
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allege specific facts from which it can be inferred that
they hold a political opinion known to the persecutor,
and that the persecution occurred on account of that
political opinion.[14] The protected ground of (imputed) political opinion is a valid strategy when advocating for victims claiming asylum for gang opposition.
For example, although gangs are not “the state,” in the
Northern Triangle, certain gangs operate as the “de
facto” government and wield more power and control
over the country and its citizens.[15] The UNHCR
explained that “[t]he ground of political opinion
needs to reflect the reality of the specific geographical,
historical, political, legal, judicial, and sociocultural
context of the country of origin.[16] In contexts, such
as in El Salvador and Guatemala, objections to the activities of gangs may be considered as opinions that are
critical of the methods and policies of those in control
and, thus, constitute a “political opinion” within the
meaning of the refugee definition. For example, individuals who resist recruitment by gangs, or who refuse
to comply with demands made by the gangs, such as
demands to pay extortion money, may be perceived as
holding a political opinion. In addition, the gangs in
the Northern Triangle have demonstrated a capacity
to challenge states directly by murdering state officials
and controlling other corrupt law enforcement, political, or local security officers. Therefore, those victims
who resist such authorities are persecuted on
account of their political opinion because, in the
Northern Triangle, the gangs have infiltrated the state
and are in control of the political world.[17]

Ninth Circuit, the Court in Regalado-Escobar v. Holder, found that opposition to a strategy of violence can
constitute a political opinion for asylum purposes.[20]
In their article ‘Third Generation’ Gangs, Warfare in
Central America, and Refugee Law’s Political Opinion
Ground, Deborah Anker and Palmer Lawrence argue
that despite the positive foundation, Immigration
Judges dealing with seriously overloaded dockets, limited authority to grant continuances, and completion
quotas will be hard-pressed to engage in “complex and
contextual factual inquiry.”[21] Practitioners should
do their best to educate adjudicators through country-condition evidence, expert testimony, memoranda
of law, and detailed direct examination of the asylum
seeker.
For example, in Marroquin-Ochoma v Holder, the
Eighth Circuit indicated that “. . . [e]vidence that the
gang is politically minded could be considered evidence that the gang members would be somewhat
more likely to attribute political opinions to resisters,”
but found that a “generalized political motive underlying the gang’s forced recruitment” was inadequate evidence to establish that resistance to the recruitment efforts was based on an anti-gang political opinion.[22]
More recently, this approach succeeded in the Fourth
Circuit case, Alvarez Lagos, where the Court concluded that the country conditions and evidence presented
by the applicant showed that Mara 18, a powerful gang
in the Americas, imputed her anti-gang political opinion and that opinion was one central reason for her
persecution.[23] Expert testimony showed that Alvarez Lagos’s failure to comply with the gang’s demands
and subsequent flight to the United States would be
seen by Mara 18 as “a direct challenge to its efforts to
establish and maintain political domination within
Honduras.” As a direct result, she would be “targeted
for violence in a manner that was very graphic, and
visible to the community.” Another expert explained
that failure to pay was not simply a refusal to pay a
debt, but Mara 18 would feel “compelled to crush what
it views as political resistance.”

Although some immigration courts have failed to
find asylum based on this approach, the adjudicators
explained that they were not presented with enough
evidence to show significant gang control of the state.
For example, Matter of S-P- held that imputed political
opinion may satisfy the refugee definition.[18] Therefore, with some adjustments, advocates can use this
case to make valid asylum claims.
Additionally, in Koudriachova v. Gonzales, the Second
Circuit emphasized, for imputed political opinion, “the
relevant question is not whether an applicant subjectively holds a particular political view, but instead,
whether the authorities in the applicant’s home country perceive him to hold a political opinion and would
persecute him on that basis.”[19] When determining
authorities, “adjudicators must consider the claim
within the context of the country itself.” Also, in the

Although the imputed political opinion route may be
weaker than the well-established, but recently contested, protected ground of “particular social group,”
it does not diminish the fact that it is a perfectly valid
way to argue a protected category. Under current case
law, international law, and conditions in the Northern
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Triangle, the Courts are making the correct decisions
in recognizing (imputed) political opinion. The idea
that opinions or matters that involve gangs might constitute political opinion is supported by the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), which has recently published Eligibility
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection
Needs of Asylum Seekers from Guatemala (January
2018), El Salvador (March 2016), and Honduras (July
2016).[24] Therefore, the U.S. has a duty under the
obligations of the Refugee Convention and Optional
Protocol to recognize this protected category.
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